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FORUM JURIDICUM
THE PROBLEMS OF THE
OWNER IN FEDERAL CONDEMNATION
Ralph L. Kaskell, Jr.*
The 1965 seminar of the Louisiana Chapter of the American
Right-of-Way Assocation reviewed recent federal condemnation
cases.' When these were compared with decisions of Louisiana
state courts, the result was to emphasize the disadvantages that
burden an owner who must fight for "just compensation" in
federal courts.
For example, under Louisiana law special benefits may be
offset only against severance damages.2 But in federal eminent
domain cases it is constitutional for the Congress to direct that
special benefits be offset, not only against severance damages,
but also against the value of the land actually taken for a
project.3
This the Congress has done with respect to property partially
taken in connection "with any improvement of rivers, harbors,
canals or waterways."' 4 Likewise, in enacting statutes for putting
in streets in the District of Columbia, Congress directed that spe-
cial benefits be assessed against owners from whom the land
was taken.5
In the Algiers Cut-Off Canal case in Louisiana, brought
under 33 U.S.C. section 595, the commission found that a par-
ticular tract of land taken for the canal was worth $17,500.
However, special benefits to the remaining land were found to
be in excess of that amount, and the landowner was given no
cash payment, despite arguments of unconstitutionality and the
speculative nature of the special benefits.6
*Partner in the law firm of Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, New Orleans, Lou-
isiana.
1. These numbered well over one hundred reported decisions since January 1,
1963, and only a few could be taken up during one afternoon.
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2633 (1870) ; LA. R.S. 19:9 (1950) ; Louisiana High-
way Comm'n v. Grey, 197 La. 942, 2 So.2d 654 (1941). That is the modern
trend throughout the country. 3 NicHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, 97, § 8.6206:1
(1950).
3. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 (1943).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 595 (1958).
5. Baruman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1896).
6. United States v. 1,000 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Plaquemines Parish,
La., 162 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. La. 1958).
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It is clear that, if the Congress directs, land may be taken
without payment of money, on the basis of anticipated special
benefits. While no Supreme Court case seems to have passed
directly on the point, it seems probable that, even in the absence
of a statute such as 33 U.S.C. section 595, the broad language of
earlier opinions would require that the value of land taken be
offset by estimated special benefits.
Two recent opinions by federal courts are efforts to soften
what, to an owner, must seem a harsh rule.
In United States v. 133.79 Acres of Land, Etc.,7 the Govern-
ment, under 33 U.S.C. section 595, took a permanent easement
to construct channel improvements in connection with the control
of the Arkansas River. The perpetual easement area took some
97 acres of a small island of about 160 acres.
The government appraiser valued the entire tract at $12,000
before the taking, and then valued the remainder of the land,
62 acres, after the imposition of the easement, at $60,000. Of
course, on that basis, the owner would get nothing for his land.
The Court stated the rule established by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 1958 as follows: "Spe-
cial benefits are those which arise from the peculiar relation of
the land in question to the public improvement . . . in other
words, the general benefits are those which result from the en-
joyment of the facilities provided by the new public work and
from the increased general prosperity resulting from such en-
joyment. The special benefits are ordinarily merely incidental
and may result from physical changes in the land, from prox-
imity to a desirable object, or in various other ways."
The Court concluded that the Government had shown no
special or direct benefits to this particular piece of land because
of the taking of some 97 out of 160 acres. The decision seems
correct, because the landowner had an island with frontage on
the river before the taking, and he similarily had frontage on
the river after the taking.8
Special and direct benefits seem to be found when the project
results in giving an owner frontage on a street or a canal which
he did not have before. Even though benefit may accrue to land
7. 230 F. Supp. 973 (W.D. Ark. 1964).
8. See United States v. Alcorn, 80 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1935).
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at a short distance from the new canal or the new street, it
generally seems to be held to have received only general benefits,
and not special benefits.
Likewise, in United States v. 2,685.04 Acres of Land, Etc.,9
the Government was trying to offset special benefits under 33
U.S.C. section 595 by evaluating the remainder land as suitable
for a campsite or lake shore development. This gave a higher
value for the remainder land than that fixed by the owner's
appraisers.
The court held that "benefits that can only be realized by the
expenditures of substantial sums of money in a project so un-
certain as this lake shore lot development, are not, in our judg-
ment, the kind of benefits Congress contemplated. . . . This
testimony is highly speculative and too remote to have any real-
istic effect upon value. We regard it as incompetent and preju-
dicial to the rights of the" owners.
Another hazard to an owner is the right of the federal gov-
ernment to harm the owner's land, short of a "taking," without
payment of just compensation. This is now a common thing
around airfields and missile sites. The Federal Constitution,
unlike many state constitutions, provides just compensation only
for property "taken," and not for mere damage to property. 10
For example, two cases in 1964 found as a fact substantial
interference with the owners' use and enjoyment of their prop-
erty in the vicinity of an Air Force Base, but denied recovery.
In Bellamy v. United States," the claim rested on plaintiff's
allegations that the Air Force, at all hours of the day and night,
would fasten jet engines on what were called "trim tabs," to test
them. The jet engines were run at very high speeds, emitting
loud noises and fumes and causing surrounding objects to
vibrate. The noise created at certain times ranged between 90
and 95 decibels.
However, the court held that "unless this interference
amounts to a total destruction or deprivation of all or most of
9. 336 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1964).
10. U.S. CONST. amend V. Cf. LA. CONST. art. I, § 2, providing that "private
property shall not be taken or damaged except for public purposes and after just
and adequate compensation is paid."
11. 235 F. Supp. 139 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
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the plaintiff's interests, it does not constitute a taking and is
not compensable under the Tucker Act.' '12
In Leavell v. United States,1 the testing of jet engines on
Shaw Air Force Base caused a decibel range of from 90 to 117,
"shaking windows and rattling pictures and dishes, drowning
out conversation, radio and television, and making it difficult if
not impossible to sleep."
The Court pointed out that there had to be "a taking" of the
property under the fifth amendment, that there is a distinction
in federal law between a taking and consequential damages, and
that to be compensable, a taking, short of actual occupancy, has
to be government action in which the "effects are so complete as
to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject
matter."
In Avery v. United States, 4 the court was dealing with a
claim for avigation easements taken over 33 parcels of land in
Florida. Before the litigation, the United States has secured
avigation easements over some parcels allowing flights as low
as 29 feet above the ground. Plaintiffs now contended that the
introduction of larger and noisier aircraft constituted a further
taking and an uncompensated expansion of the existing ease-
ment. The court held that the introduction of new aircraft, and
the increase of operations, resulting in greater noise and greater
inconvenience, caused a further reduction of land values. It was
a new and further taking as to these parcels.
Other parcels involved overflights, but above an altitude of
500 feet. Consequently, there was no compensable taking of an
easement on those parcels, and the inconvenience and injury to
the property, incidental and unavoidably attendant upon the use
of airways, was not compensable, even though the vibrations and
noise were just as bad as over those parcels subject to an ease-
ment.
These principles, antedating the cases just discussed, led to
the interesting and anomalous case of United States v. 8276.21
Acres of Land (Miramar), 15 where, the court was puzzled as to
what to tell the jury to return as a formal verdict.
12. This is -to be distinguished from continuous low altitude flights which
amount to a "taking" of a permanent avigation easement. United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946).
13. 234 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
14. 330 F.2d 640 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
15. 222 F.2d 887 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
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The government had started a condemnation suit in July
1958 and made a deposit for taking the fee of certain land
around an airbase. However, there were flights that had begun
over the surrounding land prior to February 1952, and the gov-
ernment claimed that they had become so extensive and had so
interfered with the rights of the owners that the government had
taken an incipient easement beginning in February 1952; and
that by July 1958, the date of the filing of suit, the government
had acquired title to an avigation easement by the prescriptive
or limitation period of six years. Therefore, the government
contended that in July 1958, when it started the condemnation
suit, it already owned an avigation easement by prescription,
and all it had to pay for was the value of the fee, less the dam-
ages caused by the avigation easement.
The court had found that the flights were not sufficient to
be a taking until August 1955; and that, thereafter, beginning
in August 1955, the flights were so extensive and oppressive that
they constituted a taking of an easement which would give the
government title, if the flights lasted six years without suit
being brought by the owners, or at such time as the government
did file suit and make a deposit to cover the easement. Because
of the deposit and suit of 1958, the government acquired title
in fee.
The landowners took the position that, under the well-known
case of United States v. Miller 6 (which holds that the land-
owner has no right to any increase in value due to the fact that
a particular tract is clearly or probably within a government
project, even though suit had not yet been filed, and hence specu-
lative value has to be excluded in determining what is just com-
pensation), the reverse must be true; and the court must exclude
any depreciation in value caused by the prospective taking, once
the government is committed to a project.
In submitting the case to the jury the trial judge had given
the jury the right to make two different findings so that there
would be a complete record for an appellate court, if it went up
on review. The first alternative was in valuing the land at the
date of taking (July 1958), to ignore all flights over the land
after August 5, 1955 (when the court had found that for the
first time the government had taken an easement), until the date
16. 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
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of taking the fee in July 1958. Also, the jury was to ignore all
regular and systematic flights over the land which occurred
prior to August 1955. The jury came back with a verdict of
$3,250,000.00.
The second alternative was again to ignore all flights after
August 1955, until the date of taking (because the court had
found that from August 1955 on, the government had taken an
easement and had to pay for it), but the jury could take into
account the regular and systematic flights over the land which
occurred prior to August 1955, (which was the first time that
they became so extensive that the court felt that an easement
had actually been taken). The jury found under this alternative
a verdict of $3,075,000. The difference in the verdicts was that,
when the jury considered the regular and systematic flights,
less than an easement, which occurred over the land prior to
August 1955, which they considered as a detriment or a burden
on the land, they brought back a verdict of $175,000.00 less.
Faced with these two alternate verdicts, the court discussed
the matter at some length. The problem is one we're facing in
Louisiana and Mississippi, with airfields being built; and the
Pearl River-Louisiana and Mississippi-testing project, in which
the government is taking an easement over a large area of land,
for a vibration or non-habitation easement. But, we don't know
when the government may have to extend the borders of that
easement and take lands, perhaps all the way to the Gulf Coast,
in order to allow the project to develop to its full extent. There
may be vibrations and annoyances coming up gradually in the
areas beyond the present perimeter, so that the holding in the
Miramar case may be of significance for those of us in the Mis-
sissippi and Louisiana condemnation cases going on now, and
for the next several years.
Since the government had actually taken an easement from
August 1955 on (for which it had to pay), the jury could ignore
that and try to estimate the value of the land as of the date of
taking in 1958, because the government had to pay any damage
that occurred from 1955 on, in any event; and the jury did not
have to depreciate the land because of the fact that the easement
existed from 1955 to 1958.
The real question before the jury was what it should do about
the regular and systematic flights that had occurred before
[Vol. XXVII
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August 1955, before the government had been held to have taken
an easement.
First the court discussed the Miller case, and said that that
case and following cases had to be limited to the particular hold-
ing; namely, that where property is "in the area contemplated
to be included within the government project" its value on con-
demnation may not be increased or decreased by the fact that
the government will probably take the property. However, tres-
passing over defendant's property "not sufficient to constitute
a taking" comes within a different rule.
The court felt that its finding that there was no incipient
taking up to August 1955 meant that the flights were not so
frequent and oppressive as to constitute a direct and immediate
interference with the land, and thus a taking. The fifth amend-
ment allows payment only for property "taken" for public use.
The court said this must be distinguished from state constitu-
tions (like Louisiana's) which provide that private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just com-
pensation. Therefore, this was an incidental damage, short of a
taking, which must be borne by the landowner.
The court determined that inconvenience or injury or dam-
age, caused by flights not so extensive as to constitute a taking,
are not matters which may be considered in a condemnation case,
in awarding compensation.
The court pointed out that the jury verdict, in the alternative,
meant a substantial difference to the owners, as much as $70.00
per acre on their tract of 2,400 acres.
The court finally determined that the jury, in evaluating the
premises was entitled to depreciate it, apparently, by the fact
that the land was subject to trespassing prior to August 1955;
and ordered judgment entered for the lesser amount.
As I understand that holding, in the present situation that
we have in Mississippi, if lands beyond the perimeter of the
present vibration easement are affected somewhat, but not suf-
ficiently to constitute taking, and it is not for several years that
the government decides to take additional lands or an ease-
ment over additional lands for vibrations beyond the present
perimeter, the jury will be allowed to consider the fact that
1966]
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the land has been depreciated by those trespasses, short of a
taking. Moreover, if the interference with the land beyond the
perimeter is oppressive enough so that the government can argue
that it is now taking an easement, even though it is not paying
for it beyond the present perimeter of the testing area, and more
than six years go by, it is possible that the government will then
argue prescription or limitations, and try to use that easement
without paying any compensation. It is a grave problem and one
that will have to be considered within the next three or four
years, in Mississippi and Louisiana.
It would be natural to suggest that owners should take more
frequent appeals or fight their cases with more vigor in the trial
courts.
But the difficulty is that no costs of litigation may be as-
sessed against the United States in eminent domain areas.17
Large eminent domain suits require from thirty to ninety days
for trial. Expert fees run into several thousands of dollars. A
record of several thousand pages may cost ten or fifteen thou-
sand dollars to multilith or print for an appeal; especially if the
owner goes all the way to the United States Supreme Court.
If an appeal costs $20,000, which cannot be recovered from
the United States, it is clear that an owner cannot afford to
appeal a $20,000 mistake by the trial court. Even if he wins, the
owner ends up with nothing.
CONCLUSION
Our job as lawyers is to try cases within the rules as we find
them in decided cases. But, we should suggest changes that will
be equitable to the landowner, and not an unfair burden to the
government.
17. United States Tennessee Valley Authority v. Easement and Right of Way
Over Certain Land in Smith County, Tennessee, 214 F. Supp. 29 (M.D. Tenn.
1959). Recent legislation, approved July 18, 1966 (PL 89-507, 80 Stat. 308,
amending U.S.C. § 2412 (1966)), now authorizes the award of costs to the
prevailing party, in any action brought by or against the United States or United
States agency or official in his official capacity. Unfortunately, this does not
help in this particular specialized litigation because, in eminent domain cases,
the United States is always the prevailing party. For that reason Rule 71A(1)
states that, in a condemnation action, "costs are not subject to Rule 54(d)."
28 U.S.C. 2412 and Rule 54(d) are quite similar, and subdivision (1) of Rule
71A was included so as to avoid automatic imposition of costs in favor of the
United States, as the prevailing party, against all landowners in all eminent
domain proceedings. See Judge Wright's opinion in United States v. 1,000 Acres
of Land, More or Less, in Plaquemines Parish, La., 162 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. La.
1958).
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First, legislation in the Congress could expand the rule of
just compensation to include payment for damages to land, as
well as for land taken; and to prevent the offset of estimated
special benefits against the value of land actually taken.
Secondly, the Congress should allow the assessment of litiga-
tion costs against the government, including expert fees and at-
torneys' fees. The present cost of contesting the value set by
the government, inevitably prevents the owner from receiving
just compensation.
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